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FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT FUNDAMENTALS
By Jessica Tillipman

F

oreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement activity is currently at its highest level since enactment
of the statute in 1977.1 There were more enforcement actions brought in 2007 than in the years
between 2004 and 2006 combined. Moreover, both the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Department of Justice have made clear that FCPA enforcement is a top priority and they will be
devoting all resources necessary to enforcing this statute.2 As noted by Attorney General Michael B.
Mukasey, the DOJ alone brought 16 FCPA enforcement actions against individuals and corporations
in 2007, including charges against seven individuals.3 “These 16 enforcement actions represent[ed]
a 100 percent increase over the 8 enforcement actions brought in 2006, which was itself the largest
total in the FCPA’s 30-year history.”4 The message is clear—the U.S. Government is committed to
FCPA compliance and there is no evidence enforcement activity will slow any time soon.
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Though it is difficult to identify one particular
reason for this flurry of enforcement activity, it is
likely this trend has been caused, at least in part,
by the Government’s broad interpretation of the
FCPA’s prohibitions and jurisdictional provisions.
While many of the recent enforcement activities
involve U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries, there has also been a substantial increase
in the number of investigations and enforcement
actions involving purely foreign concerns as well.
Jessica Tillipman is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School. Until recently, Ms. Tillipman was an associate
at Jenner & Block, LLP. The author would like to thank Damien Specht for
his assistance in the preparation of this Briefing Paper.
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These actions demonstrate the Government’s intent to push FCPA jurisdiction to its limits—even
pursuing actions against foreign companies that
have already been prosecuted by other foreign
governments. In addition to the increasing risk
for foreign-based companies, agency and representative relationships remain at high risk for
FCPA compliance problems. A sizeable number
of recent enforcement actions have involved
agents, representatives, or distributors running
afoul of the FCPA’s antibribery prohibitions while
they performed services in foreign countries. As
a result, it is imperative that companies continue
to keep a close eye on their intermediaries and
ensure they have adequate internal controls in
place.
While the rise in enforcement actions is a
cause of great concern for most companies, these
actions provide insight into the Government’s
FCPA compliance expectations and its interpretation of some of the Act’s more challenging
provisions. 5 Furthermore, the DOJ continues
to offer guidance regarding FCPA compliance
through its FCPA Opinion Procedure under
which agency provides responses to specific
inquiries submitted by companies concerning
the legality of their conduct under the FCPA. 6
While the DOJ acknowledges this procedure has
traditionally been an underutilized resource,
the agency has made clear that it expects companies to take advantage of the FCPA guidance
provided in DOJ FCPA Opinions. As explained
by Former Assistant Attorney General Alice
Fisher, “it serves both [Government and business] interests to avoid FCPA violations before
they occur, and the opinion procedure is one
way to make that happen.” 7
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Another likely cause of the recent upward
trend in enforcement activity is the self-reporting of potential FCPA violations. A variety of
factors, including the reporting requirements
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,8 the threat of
fines and incarceration, and fear of irreversible reputational damage, have prompted many
companies to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA
violations. Although the Government continues
to encourage disclosures and promises leniency
in return, a review of enforcement actions over
the past few years indicates this not necessarily
the case. Recent voluntarily disclosed FCPA violations have been settled with enormous fines,
lengthy prison terms, the imposition of corporate monitors, and, when settling with the SEC,
the disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains. In fact,
2007 saw Baker Hughes Inc. resolving its FCPA
enforcement actions with the Government by
agreeing to the largest monetary sanction ever
imposed in an FCPA case totaling $44 million
(a criminal fine totaling $11 million and a civil
penalty and disgorgement totaling $33 million).9
The size of this penalty makes it difficult to see
how Baker Hughes received credit for its voluntary
disclosure. Moreover, the Government continues
to require the retention of independent compliance monitors as a condition to settling enforcement actions.10 While the Government contends
that monitors are not a presumptive condition
of settlement agreements,11 recent enforcement
activity indicates otherwise. Corporate monitors
are not only expensive, but, given the substantial
latitude and vast powers afforded to monitors by
the Government, they are also intrusive. Whether
the significant costs associated with voluntary
disclosures will curb the trend of self-reporting
in the future remains to be seen.
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This B riefing P aper provides a general overview of the FCPA and guidance with respect to
the more challenging provisions of the Act. It
also highlights recent trends in FCPA enforcement and compliance. Specifically, the P aper
(a) provides a detailed discussion of the Act’s
provisions, definitions of its key terms, and a
guidance regarding the exception and affirmative defenses to the antibribery prohibitions,
(b) presents the bases for corporate liability under the FCPA, including liability for the actions
of intermediaries, employees, and subsidiaries
or affiliates, (c) discusses the jurisdictional
provisions of the Act in detail and highlights
recent enforcement trends involving foreign
entities, including parallel prosecutions, and
(d) addresses the ongoing trend of self-reporting FCPA violations, the consequences of FCPA
violations, and recent trends in the resolution
of FCPA enforcement actions, including the
frequent appointment of compliance monitors,
and collateral or related litigation.

■

Antibribery Prohibitions

The FCPA antibribery provisions, as amended
in 1998,14 prohibit a company from corruptly
offering or paying money or offering or giving
anything of value, directly or indirectly through
agents or intermediaries, to a foreign official
to obtain or retain business.15 Specifically, the
antibribery provisions prohibit:16
(1) Any act corruptly taken either through
use the mails or of any instrumentality of
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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interstate commerce or while in the territory of the United States,
(2) In furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment
of any money or offer, gift, promise to give,
or authorization of the giving of anything
of value to:
(a) A foreign official;
(b) A foreign political party or official
thereof;
(c) A candidate for foreign political office;
or
(d) Any person, while knowing that all or
a portion of such money or thing of
value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any of the
above,
(3) For the purposes of:
(a) Influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity;

FCPA Basics
The FCPA has two components: (1) the antibribery prohibitions and (2) the recordkeeping and internal control provisions. The Act’s
antibribery component prohibits payments to
foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business.12 The Act’s books-and-records
provisions require the maintenance of reasonably
accurate accounting records and adequate internal
controls.13 The plain language of the FCPA is less
than clear, but its definitional sections, legislative
history, relevant case law, enforcement actions,
and the DOJ’s FCPA Opinions have helped to
clarify the Act’s meaning.
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(b) Inducing such foreign official to do or
omit to do any act in violation of the
lawful duty of such official;
(c) Securing any improper advantage; or
(d) Inducing such foreign official to use
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of
such government or instrumentality,
(4) In order to assist in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business
to, any person.
■

FCPA Jurisdiction

The FCPA applies to companies and persons
based on either (a) the country in which the
improper activity occurred (territorial-based
jurisdiction) or (b) the origin of the party committing the act (nationality-based jurisdiction).
Territorial jurisdiction covers persons or companies that commit an act within the territory of
the United States “in furtherance of” a corrupt
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payment or offer of payment, using the U.S. mails
or other means or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. “Territory of the United States” has
been interpreted broadly, encompassing “all areas
over which the United States asserts territorial
jurisdiction.”17 In 1998, Congress amended the
FCPA by expanding the “in furtherance of” requirement, making clear that the requirement
is not limited to actions that make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.18 Rather, with respect to foreign
companies and persons, the FCPA applies to any
act taken within the United States that furthers
the improper payment.19 Congress views “any act
committed by a foreign national within the United
States,” in furtherance of a bribe, to fall within
its power to regulate “Commerce with foreign
Nations.”20 All that is required for liability under
the Act is that some conduct occur that facilitates
or carries forward the prohibited activity.
Territorial jurisdiction applies to “issuers,”
“domestic concerns,” and foreign companies
and persons.21 An “issuer” is a U.S. or foreign
company, or an officer, employee, agent or
stockholder thereof, that either issues securities
(or American Depositary Receipts) or must file
reports with the SEC.22 A “domestic concern”
is defined by the Act as any citizen, national or
resident of the United States or any corporation
or other business entity with its principal place of
business in the United States or that is organized
under the laws of a state of the United States.23 As
part of its 1998 amendments, Congress extended
the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction to include non”issuer” foreign companies and individuals that
commit an act in furtherance of the bribe while
in the territory of the United States.24 Nationality-based jurisdiction, applicable to domestic
concerns and U.S. issuers, pertains to acts taken
entirely outside the United States, as long as the
act is in furtherance of the improper payment
or offer, regardless of whether the U.S. mails or
other means or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce are used.25
■

FCPA Definitions & Standards

The term “foreign official,” as defined by
the FCPA, applies to officers or employees of
a foreign government, including its depart
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ments, agencies and instrumentalities, public
international organizations, or persons acting
in an official capacity for or on behalf of these
entities.26 A review of U.S. Government enforcement actions demonstrates that the Government
interprets “foreign official” broadly, including
advisors to foreign officials, foreign political
parties and their officials, candidates for public
office, and private corporations entrusted with
quasi-governmental functions. Congress added
the term “public international organization” to
the definition of “foreign official” in 1998 to
include officers or employees of such entities as
the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, and the Red Cross.27
The antibribery component of the FCPA includes a prohibition against giving “anything of
value” for an improper purpose.28 The phrase
“thing of value” has been construed broadly and
is not limited to money. There is no minimum
value that must be met before the “thing of value”
constitutes an improper gift. Examples include,
but are not limited to stocks, travel expenses,
entertainment, hospitality provided to a foreign
official’s spouse or children, discounts on products or services, forgiveness of outstanding debt,
donations to a charitable organization on behalf
of the foreign official, or employing a foreign official or the official’s relative. Generally, whether
an item constitutes a “thing of value” depends
on the subjective value attached by the particular
recipient.29 In addition, because the Act also prohibits the “offer,” “promise,” or “authorization”
of payments of money or of gifts to an official,
mere offers or promises to pay money or to give
a thing of value in the future fall within the Act’s
purview.30
Liability under the antibribery provisions attaches only if the improper payment or gift is
made “corruptly,”31 meaning with an “evil motive
or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the
recipient.”32 This standard is met if the payment,
gift, or offer is made for one of the four reasons
expressly provided in the FCPA: (1) influencing
any act or decision of the foreign official in his
official capacity under circumstances where the
official has discretion and the payment is given
to influence the discretionary decision, (2) inducing the foreign official to do or omit to do
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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any act in violation of the official’s lawful duty,
(3) inducing the foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
to affect or influence any act or decision of the
government or instrumentality, or (4) securing
any improper advantage.33 The term “securing
any improper advantage” applies to anything to
which “the company concerned was not clearly
entitled, for example, an operating permit for a
factory which fails to meet the statutory requirements.” 34 Since the FCPA prohibits offering,
paying or giving, promising to pay or give, or
authorizing to pay or give money or anything of
value for any of these four reasons, FCPA liability
may attach even if the corrupt act does not succeed in its purpose.35
The improper payment, gift, or offer must
also be made to obtain or retain business.36 Like
other terms in the Act, the phrase “obtaining or
retaining” business has been construed broadly,
applying to any improper payment or gift that
is “intended to assist the payor, either directly
or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business
for some person.”37 As long as it can be demonstrated that the payment could provide an unfair
advantage over competitors and assist the payor
in obtaining or retaining business, this element
of the antibribery prohibition will be satisfied.38
In other words, this standard is not limited to
payments or gifts made in exchange for the
award or renewal of contracts or other business
opportunities with a foreign government. Rather,
this standard may be satisfied under a variety
of circumstances including the reduction of
tax liability,39 preferential treatment during the
customs process,40 and payments made to secure
debt owed to a company.41
In regard to liability under the Act for payments
or gifts to “any person,” i.e., a third party, “while
knowing” that the payment or gift will be made,
offered, or promised, directly or indirectly, to a
foreign official for improper purposes,42 the FCPA
does not require proof that the person making
the payment or gift has actual knowledge of the
improper activity. Rather, the “knowing” standard is satisfied if “(i) such person is aware that
such person is engaging in such conduct, that
such circumstance exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or (ii) such person
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or
that such result is substantially certain to occur.”43
Moreover, “knowledge is established if a person
is aware of a high probability of the existence of
such circumstance, unless the person actually
believes that such circumstance does not exist.”44
While Congress has made clear that negligence
does not form the basis for liability, the Act does
encompass circumstances under which a person
acts in conscious disregard, willful blindness, or deliberate ignorance of circumstances that should alert
one to the likelihood of an FCPA violation.45
■

The Exception & Affirmative Defenses To
Antibribery Liability

The FCPA contains a limited exception to
the anti-bribery prohibitions for “facilitating”
(sometimes referred to as “grease”) payments.
Specifically, the Act does not apply “to any facilitating payment or expediting payment to a
foreign official, political party, or party official
the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure
the performance of a routine governmental action.”46 The purpose of the exception is to allow
companies to make payments to foreign officials
to speed up the performance of “non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed by mid- or
low-level foreign functionaries.”47
The Act limits the term “routine governmental
action” to actions that are ordinarily and commonly
performed by a foreign official in “(i) obtaining
permits, licenses, or other official documents
to qualify a person to do business in a foreign
country; (ii) processing governmental papers,
such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing
police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or
scheduling inspections associated with contract
performance or inspections related to transit of
goods across country; (iv) providing phone service,
power and water supply, loading and unloading
cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a
similar nature.”48 “Routine governmental actions”
do not encompass decisions made by foreign officials to award new business to or to continue
business with a particular party.49
This exception for “facilitating” payments
has been construed narrowly, and it is often
difficult for companies to determine whether
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certain payments qualify under it. As a result,
companies should use great caution and carefully
scrutinize proposed transactions when seeking
to justify payments under this exception.
In addition to the exception for “facilitating”
payments, the FCPA provides two affirmative
defenses to liability under the antibribery prohibitions for payments or gifts to foreign officials
that were (1) lawful under the written laws and
regulations of the foreign official’s country or
(2) “reasonable and bona fide” expenditures
incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official
“directly related” to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services or
the execution or performance of a contract with
a foreign government or agency.50
With respect to the first affirmative defense, a
payment may only qualify under this provision if
it is expressly authorized under the written laws
or regulations of the foreign country. Indirect
references in the law, such as a tax deduction for
improper payments, do not qualify under this
defense. Moreover, this defense is rarely available
because such payments are seldom permitted
under the local laws of most countries.
The second affirmative defense to the antibribery provisions of the FCPA permits payments or
gifts incurred in connection with the promotion
or demonstration of company products or services or with the execution of a contract with a
foreign government. This “promotional expenses”
defense permits U.S. companies to pay “reasonable and bona fide” expenses associated with a
foreign official’s visit to the United States, as long
as they are directly related to the promotion or
demonstration of a product or the performance
of a government contract. The application of
this affirmative defense has caused problems for
companies in the past. Companies often have
trouble determining the extent to which a foreign official’s expenses may be covered. Several
recent FCPA enforcement actions have provided
companies with additional guidance regarding
the use of this affirmative defense.
In December 2007, Lucent Technologies Inc.
settled FCPA charges with the SEC and the DOJ
for improper payments related to “promotional
expenses” for Chinese government officials.51
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This enforcement action demonstrates the type
of conduct that is outside the scope of the “promotional expenses” affirmative defense. Lucent
spent more than $10 million sponsoring trips
for Chinese government officials. The trips consisted of primarily sightseeing to locations such
as Disneyland, Universal Studios, and the Grand
Canyon, and in cities such as Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Las Vegas, Washington, D.C., and New
York City. The trips typically lasted 14 days each
and cost between $25,000 and $55,000 per trip.
Lucent also provided between $500 and $1,000
per day to the traveling foreign officials as a “per
diem.” The trips were approved by senior Lucent
Officials and improperly recorded in the company’s
books and records. Specifically, the trips were
primarily characterized in the company’s books
and records as “factory inspections” or “training”
in relation to contracts with its Chinese government customers even though the trips involved
little business content. While the facts clearly
indicate a violation of the FCPA’s antibribery
prohibitions, the Government charged Lucent
only with violating the Act’s books-and-records
and internal control provisions (discussed below)
for improperly recording expenses and failing
to maintain an adequate system of internal controls.
Similarly, in October 2007, Ingersoll-Rand Co.
Ltd.’s Italian affiliate settled fraud and FCPA
charges after, among other improper activities,
it sponsored eight officials from the Iraqi Oil
Ministry to spend two days touring a manufacturing facility in Italy and an additional two days
“on holiday” touring Florence at the company’s
expense.52 The officials were also given $8,000
in “pocket money.” Not only were these activities
excluded from the purview of the affirmative
defense, the company also violated the booksand-records and internal control provisions
of the FCPA by failing to properly record the
payments in its books and records (referring to
the payments under a general ledger account as
“cost of sales deferred”). Delta & Pine Land Co.
and its subsidiary, Turk Deltapine, Inc., also ran
afoul of the FCPA’s antibribery and books-andrecords provisions.53 On July 25 and 26, 2007, the
SEC filed two settled enforcement proceedings
against the company, alleging that from 2001 to
2006, Turk Deltapine made payments valued at
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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approximately $43,000 (including cash, payment
of travel and hotel expenses, air conditioners,
computers, office furniture, and refrigerators) to
multiple officials of the Turkish Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs to obtain governmental
reports and certifications that were necessary for
Turk Deltapine to operate its business in Turkey.
In settling with the SEC, Delta & Pine and Turk
Deltapine jointly agreed to pay a $300,000 civil
penalty.
The enforcement action against Paradigm B.V.
provides another example of conduct that falls
outside the scope of the “promotional expenses”
affirmative defense.54 On September 24, 2007,
Paradigm settled an FCPA enforcement action
with the DOJ related to improper payments made
to government officials in China, Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Nigeria. Among other
allegations, the DOJ contended that Paradigm paid
travel and entertainment expenses for officials
of government-owned oil companies in China,
including “training” trips in connection with business opportunities with the Chinese government.
The “training” trip expenses included airfare,
hotel, meals, gifts, cash per diems, and entertainment—including sightseeing and cash payments
for shopping. The total amount of the payments
could not be determined from the company’s
documentation. Paradigm admitted to similar
conduct in Mexico, including sponsoring the trip
of a Mexican government official employed by the
Mexican national oil company (Pemex) to Napa
Valley, California for “relationship building and
client development.” The trip, which involved
visits to wineries and dinners and coincided with
the Pemex official’s birthday, cost approximately
$12,000 total for all attendees. Paradigm Mexico
also spent approximately $10,000 entertaining the
same Pemex government official by paying for his
dinners, drinks, and other activities. Paradigm’s
deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ
required the company to pay a $1 million penalty, implement rigorous internal controls, retain
outside compliance counsel, and cooperate fully
with the Department.
Other lessons may be derived from recent DOJ
FCPA Opinions that explain the proper way in
which to handle the expenses associated with
visits from foreign officials so that the activity is
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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covered by the affirmative defense.55 The DOJ
Opinions’ discussion of the factual scenarios
provided by requesters provides insight into the
type of contemplated conduct covered by this
affirmative defense. For example:
(1) Companies should avoid financing the trip
of an official’s spouse, family, or any guests
of the official.56
(2) Any unnecessary upgrades to transportation or lodging should be avoided.57
(3) Payments should be made directly to a service provider and not directly to or through
the foreign official.58
(4) Expenditures should be closely tailored to
the purpose of the trip, with reasonable
estimates of the costs established before
the official’s trip.59
(5) Companies should avoid providing officials
with large sums of spending or “pocket
money” or providing extravagant entertainment for the officials during promotional trips.60
(6) While a modest meals and entertainment
(e.g., a brief sightseeing tour) may be
permissible, most other forms of entertainment should be covered by the officials
themselves.61
(7) Any souvenirs that the requestor may provide to the officials may only be of nominal
value.62
(8) Reimbursement of modest expenses incurred by a foreign official may be made
only upon presentation of a written receipt.63
(9) Companies should be careful not to select
the particular government officials they
will be hosting for the demonstration.
This decision should be made solely by the
foreign government.64
(10) Before the trip, a company should obtain
written assurance from an established law
firm with offices in both the United States
and the foreign country that the sponsorship of the visit and its payment of the
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expenses is not contrary to the law of the
foreign country.65
(11) All costs and expenses incurred by the
company in connection with the visit must
be accurately recorded in the company’s
books and records.66
This guidance demonstrates that the affirmative
defense for promotional expenses is narrow in
scope and any such expenditures must be directly
related to a legitimate business purpose.
■

Recordkeeping & Internal Control Provisions

In addition to the antibribery provisions, the
FCPA contains a section requiring issuers of
publicly traded securities to maintain internal
accounting and recordkeeping controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that its
financial statements are accurate.67 This section
works in tandem with the antibribery provisions
and prohibits companies from using improperly
recorded transactions or “off-the-book” accounts
as a means of furthering and concealing improper
payments to foreign officials.
The jurisdictional provisions of this section are
far less extensive than those pertaining to bribery,
covering only “issuers” (domestic and foreign
companies) that have a class of securities registered pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l and entities
that must file reports with the SEC pursuant to 15
U.S.C.A. § 78o(d).68 The recordkeeping provisions
do not extend to individuals or companies that
do not meet these requirements, regardless of
their nationality. Generally, the Act’s books-andrecords requirements mandate the maintenance
of records and accounts that “accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the issuer.” 69 In addition to these
recordkeeping requirements, this section of the
Act requires issuers to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances” transactions are
(a) executed with the authorization of company
management, (b) recorded in a manner that permits the maintenance of accountability of assets
and the preparation of financial statements in
accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, (c) restricted so that assets may be
accessed only with direct authorization of com
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pany management, and (d) reconciled properly
so that asset documentation is checked against
actual assets in reasonable intervals to permit the
resolution of any discrepancies.70
The FCPA’s recordkeeping requirements are
based on a concept of reasonableness, rather
than materiality, and include all original documents (including invoices, receipts, accounting
records, and expense reports), regardless of the
dollar amount involved in the specific transaction. Notably, the provisions are not limited
to illegal or improper payments. Rather, they
apply to all payments documented by a company—regardless of the size of the transaction.
This means the Government may prosecute a
company for violating the books-and-records
provisions, even in the absence of a separate
violation of the antibribery provisions. Moreover,
an intentional violation of the books-and-records
provisions may result in criminal liability. 71
Because the antibribery and recordkeeping
provisions of the FCPA apply separately, an
intentional violation of the accounting provisions may constitute a criminal offense “whether
or not such falsification is related to a foreign
corrupt practice proscribed by the FCPA.” 72
The SEC has taken action against companies
under the recordkeeping provisions of the Act,
even when there was insufficient evidence to
establish a separate antibribery violation.
For example, in an enforcement action against
Schering-Plough Corp., the SEC charged the
company with violating the recordkeeping and
internal control provisions of the FCPA in connection with payments made by its Polish subsidiary
to a charity associated with a Polish government
official.73 The SEC found that the company made
the payments for the purpose of influencing the
official to persuade the Polish government to
purchase Schering-Plough’s products. Although
the DOJ never charged the company with violating the antibribery provisions of the FCPA, the
SEC charged the company with violating the
books-and-records provisions, finding that the
company failed to properly record the payments.
In addition, the SEC also found the company violated the internal control provisions of the FCPA
because its system of internal controls failed to
detect or prevent the improper payments.
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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In 2007, Lucent Technologies Inc. also settled
an enforcement action related to its books-andrecords and internal controls. Specifically, Lucent
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement
with the DOJ and settled a civil action with the
SEC regarding its failure to (1) properly account in its books and records for the travel and
entertainment expenditures made on behalf of
Chinese officials and (2) implement sufficient
internal controls to prevent the improper activity.74 Though the allegations discussed improper
expenditures involving government officials, this
was a books-and-records case.
These enforcement actions demonstrate the
importance of a company’s compliance with the
FCPA’s recordkeeping and internal control requirements. If a company cannot openly record
a transaction in its books and records because of
its questionable nature, it should not go forward
with the transaction.

Bases For Liability
■

Liability For The Actions Of Intermediaries

The antibribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit
more than direct payments or gifts to foreign
officials. Rather, as noted earlier in this Paper,
the Act encompasses payments or gifts made to
a third party while knowing that the money or
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised,
directly or indirectly, to any foreign official.75
This means that FCPA liability attaches regardless of whether the payment is made directly to
the foreign official or through an intermediary
such as a third-party agent, consultant, joint
venture partner, representative, or distributor.
The high risks associated with the intermediary
relationship require that companies conduct
thorough, well-documented due diligence when
hiring international agents to conduct business
in a foreign country. Companies should have a
thorough due diligence plan in place to vet all
agents hired to perform work in foreign countries
to make certain that the company is entering
into business relationships with reputable and
qualified partners only.
To ensure consistency when conducting due
diligence, a company should have express pro© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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cedures for the hiring and vetting of foreign
intermediaries, including written standards for
the selection of intermediaries. The due diligence
should, at a minimum, verify (a) whether the potential intermediary is qualified for the position,
(b) the number of years the intermediary has
been in operation, (c) the size and adequacy of
the intermediary’s support staff and geographical coverage, (d) the intermediary’s personal or
professional ties to the foreign government or
government officials, (e) a profile of the intermediary’s current clientele, (f) its reputation with
the U.S. embassy or consulate or other businesses
that it deals with on a regular basis, and (g) its
familiarity with and willingness to adhere to the
FCPA.76 To tailor an effective compliance program
to the particular circumstances, the reputation
of the country in which the intermediary will be
acting should also be considered when conducting due diligence. For example, if the agreement
with the intermediary is to be performed in a
country known for bribery activity, a company
should employ heightened scrutiny when conducting diligence. Once a company selects an
intermediary, the selection should be reviewed
in writing, along with all related agreements and
payments.77
In addition, the language of the agreement executed between a company and a foreign agent is
crucial. While the FCPA does not expressly address
the contents of agency agreements, the Government will review an agreement’s provisions to see
if the company took necessary precautions before
entering into this type of high-risk agreement. The
DOJ has provided some guidance with respect to
contents of a proper agency agreement:78
(1) A representation by the intermediary that
it will not pay or agree to pay, directly or
indirectly, any funds or anything of value,
on behalf of the company, to any public official in the foreign country for the purpose
of influencing the official’s official acts or
to induce the official to use his influence
to the intermediary’s benefit.79
(2) A provision allowing for internal and independent audits of the books and records
of the intermediary to ensure compliance
with the FCPA.80
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(3) A statement that if the intermediary violates the FCPA or any other provision of the
agreement, the agreement will automatically be rendered void ab initio, the intermediary will automatically surrender any
claim for payment under the agreement
even for sales previously concluded or sales
previously rendered, and the company will
have the right, when required, to disclose
the agreement, alleged improper activity,
and amount of commission applicable to
the particular agreement to the U.S. Government and the foreign government in
which any improper activity took place.81
(4) A statement that the intermediary will be
solely responsible for all of its costs and
expenses incurred in connection with
its representation of the company, unless responsibility is assumed in writing
in advance with a detailed itemization of
expenses. All purchase orders and authorizations must be in writing.82
(5) A representation that neither the agent
nor any of its company representatives is a
government official, an official of a political party, a candidate for political office,
a consultant to a government official, or
affiliated with a government official and
that none of them will become an official
of the foreign government during the term
of the agreement.83
(6) Confirmation that the agreement is lawful
in the foreign country in which it is to be
performed.84
(7) A prohibition on assignment or novation
of the agreement without prior written
consent.85
While these express provisions are necessary
to protect the interests of a company that has
formed a relationship with a foreign official,
execution and monitoring of the agreement are
equally important.86 Companies should have tight
internal controls and monitoring procedures in
place to supervise the activities of the foreign
intermediary and any payments made to the
intermediary for work it has conducted on the
company’s behalf.87 Moreover, companies should
10
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clearly articulate their corporate procedures in
writing and assess the quality of their internal
controls on a regular basis to ensure that they
have effective FCPA compliance procedures in
place.88
Companies with overseas agents should also
develop and implement both an ethics policy
and a separate FCPA policy. The latter should
provide a brief overview of the FCPA bribery
provisions, present examples of prohibited activities, and contain a statement making clear the
company’s commitment to FCPA compliance. All
company employees should receive a copy of the
policies and execute a certification stating that
the employee both has read the policies and will
strictly comply with their provisions. Moreover,
all company employees involved in the selection
and monitoring of foreign agents should receive
extensive FCPA training and be kept abreast of
developments in this area of the law. A culture
of FCPA compliance may both prevent FCPA
violations and prepare a company in case FCPA
issues arise.
The combination of effective due diligence,
internal controls, training, and monitoring of
all agreements with intermediaries is necessary
to help a company identify the “red flags” associated with FCPA violations, including suspicious or
unnecessary representatives and intermediaries,
conducting business in bribery-prone countries,
requests for cash payments, excessive consulting
fees or commissions or unusual payment patterns
or financial arrangements, a refusal by prospective intermediary to certify compliance with the
FCPA, reimbursement requests for inadequately
documented expenses, sales to governmentsponsored companies, lack of transparency in
expenses and accounting records, and evidence
of close personal or professional ties to a foreign
official.89
■

Liability For The Actions Of Employees

A company can be held vicariously liable for an
employee’s violation of the FCPA. Under such circumstances, a “corporation may be held criminally
responsible for . . . [improper activity]…committed
by its employees [or agents] if they were acting
within the scope of their authority, or apparent
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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authority, and for the benefit of the corporation,
even if…such acts were against corporate policy
or express instructions.”90 To impose liability on
a corporation, the employee or agent’s improper
activities need only be motivated in part by intent
to benefit the corporation.91
Even if the conduct is not expressly authorized,
there is a high risk of liability for a company if
an employee violates the FCPA while acting, at
least in part, on behalf of the company. Under
these circumstances, the Government is likely to
take action against both the company and the
responsible employees. In fact, the SEC and the
DOJ will often take action against employees who
are viewed as most responsible for a company’s
FCPA violation.
For example, in May 2008, Willbros Group,
Inc. announced that it would pay $32.3 million in penalties and disgorgement to resolve
FCPA violations relating to its operations in
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nigeria. 92 In addition
to the company’s settlement with the SEC
and deferred prosecution agreement with the
DOJ, the Government brought charges against
company employees and officers responsible
for the improper conduct. Specifically, on July
23, 2007, the DOJ announced the indictment
of a former executive of a Willbros subsidiary,
Jason Edward Steph.93 The Government charged
Steph with conspiring to make over $6 million
in improper payments to Nigerian officials and
with money laundering based on the international transfer of some of the bribe money. The
Government also filed similar charges against
Jim Bob Brown, a former Willbros executive
who participated in three separate schemes to
bribe foreign officials. 94 Brown pleaded guilty
to the charges brought by the DOJ and entered
into an agreement with the SEC to be enjoined
from future violations for the FCPA. Other
examples of the Government’s heightened
pursuit of responsible employees and executives include Si Chan Wooh of Schnitzer Steel
Industries Inc.,95 Steven Lynwood Head of Titan
Corp., 96 and David Kay, Douglas Murphy, and
Lawrence H. Theriot of American Rice, Inc. 97
These enforcement actions against both the
companies and their employees demonstrate
the Government’s willingness to pursue dual
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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actions against corporations and responsible
individuals for their violations of the FCPA.
■

Liability For The Actions Of Subsidiaries Or
Affiliates

In addition to liability based on the actions of its
employees, companies may be held liable for the
acts of their subsidiaries or affiliates. Under the
books-and-records provisions of the FCPA, each
issuer is responsible for the books and records of
domestic and foreign subsidiaries and affiliates
over which it holds greater than 50% of the voting
power.98 Under these circumstances, companies
must ensure their subsidiaries and affiliates comply with the FCPA’s recordkeeping provisions.99
If an issuer holds 50% or less of the voting power
of a domestic or foreign subsidiary or affiliate,
it is only required to demonstrate a good faith
effort to use its influence to cause the subsidiary
or affiliate to comply with the FCPA’s books-andrecords provisions.100 The Act requires only that
the company “use its influence, to the extent
reasonable under the issuer’s circumstances, to
cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls
consistent with” the FCPA.101 The determination
whether the company’s conduct is “reasonable
under the issuer’s circumstances,” depends on
several factors, “includ[ing] the relative degree
of the issuer’s ownership of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing
the business operations of the country in which
such firm is located.”102
While the FCPA expressly addresses liability
for company subsidiaries and affiliates under
the books-and-records provisions, there is no
similar provision in the antibribery prohibitions. Regardless, a company may still be held
liable for a subsidiary or affiliate’s violation
of the antibribery provisions if the company
“authorized, directed, or controlled the activity
in question.” 103 Unlike the recordkeeping provisions, a company’s holdings in the subsidiary
or affiliate are not a primary consideration
under the antibribery provisions. Instead, the
Government looks to the degree of control the
company has over the subsidiary or affiliate,
and its level of knowledge and participation
in the bribery scheme.
11
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Increased Prosecution Of Foreign Companies & Nationals
Recent FCPA enforcement actions demonstrate
that the U.S. Government is not hesitant to exercise its jurisdiction under the Act over foreign
entities based on their contacts with the United
States or their status as “issuers.”104 There are a
multitude of reasons for the rise in foreign enforcement activity, including the globalization of
the marketplace, increased international merger
and acquisition activity, and a rise in voluntary
disclosures of potential FCPA violations to U.S.
authorities. Irrespective of the cause for this increase in activity, the U.S. Government has made
clear its intention to take action against foreign
companies that violate the FCPA. As noted by
Alice S. Fisher, former Assistant Attorney General,
the DOJ “will not hesitate to enforce the FCPA
against foreign-owned companies, just as it does
against American companies.”105
While enforcement activity involving the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies has
been prevalent for quite some time, since 2004
there has been a steady increase in the number
of FCPA investigations involving purely foreign
companies. For example, in December 2007, Akzo
Nobel N.V., a Netherlands-based pharmaceutical
company that trades ADRs, settled an enforcement
action with the SEC in relation to its violations of
the FCPA’s recordkeeping and internal control
provisions.106 According to the SEC’s complaint,
two of Akzo Nobel’s subsidiaries made $279,491
in improper payments in connection with sales
in Iraq under the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program.
The subsidiaries characterized the payments as
“after-sales service fees,” though no legitimate
services were performed. In settling with the
SEC, Akzo Nobel agreed to pay a $750,000 penalty (plus $584,150 in prejudgment interest) and
disgorge $1,647,363 in profits. Akzo Nobel also
entered into a nonprosecution agreement with
the DOJ.
Similarly, in 2006, Statoil ASA, a Norwegian
oil and gas company that trades ADRs on the
New York Stock Exchange, settled enforcement
actions with the SEC and the DOJ in connection
with payments totaling $5.2 million to the head
of the Iranian Fuel Consumption Optimizing
12
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Organization, a subsidiary of the National Iranian
Oil Company, through an offshore intermediary
company consultant.107 The consultant made
the payments in an attempt to persuade the official to use his influence to secure an oil and
gas field contract for Statoil. In settling with the
DOJ, Statoil entered into a three-year deferred
prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $10.5
million in disgorgement. In its SEC settlement,
Statoil consented to the entry of an administrative order requiring the company to cease and
desist from committing any future violations of
the FCPA, agreed to pay $10.5 million in disgorgement, and agreed to retain a compliance
monitor for three years. The company also paid
a fine to the Norway National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic Crime
for the same activity—an amount deducted from
the U.S. fines.
Likewise, on March 20, 2008, AB Volvo, a Swedish company, settled its enforcement actions with
the SEC and the DOJ in connection with improper
activity involving the Oil For Food Program.108 Two
of its subsidiaries, Renault Trucks SAS (France) and
Volvo Construction Equipment AB(Switzerland),
also settled charges of engaging in conspiracies to
commit wire fraud and to violate the books-andrecords provisions of the FCPA. The settlements
included fines, disgorgement, and interest totaling about $19.6 million. Similarly, as noted above,
Paradigm, B.V., a company headquartered in the
Netherlands, also settled an FCPA enforcement
action in 2007 in connection with improper payments made to officials in China, Mexico, Nigeria,
Indonesia, and Kazakhstan.109 The company entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement with the
DOJ, agreeing to pay a $1 million fine, retain an
independent compliance monitor, and adopt more
stringent compliance controls. Notably, Paradigm
relocated its principal place of business from Israel
to the United States in 2005, changing its status to
a “domestic concern,” though the DOJ took prerelocation improper activity into account in this
matter.
The Government has also shown an increased
interest in prosecuting foreign nationals under the
FCPA. In March 2007, the DOJ indicted Christian
Sapsizian, a French citizen, and former executive
of French telecommunications Alcatel CIT.110
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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Sapsizian pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA
by making more than $2.5 million in improper
payments to Costa Rican government officials
to obtain a telecommunications contract. The
Government also indicted Edgar Valverde Acosta,
a Costa Rican national and Senior Country Officer of Alcatel’s Costa Rican subsidiary, based in
the same conduct.111 Another example involves
a civil injunction filed by the SEC against four
former employees of subsidiaries of ABB Ltd., a
Swiss company that trades its ADRs on the New
York Stock Exchange.112 The SEC complaint alleged that the four employees, John Samson,
John G. A. Munro, Ian N. Campbell, and John
H. Whelan, participated in a scheme to bribe
Nigerian government officials in furtherance
of ABB’s bid to obtain a government contract
to provide equipment for an oil drilling project. Samson, Munro, and Campbell are British
citizens, while Whelan is a U.S. citizen. All four
were alleged to have violated both the antibribery and books-and-records and internal control
provisions of the FCPA. Likewise, in September
2007, the SEC settled a civil enforcement action
against Chandramowli Srinivasan, a resident of
Delhi, India and the former president of A.T.
Kearney India, a subsidiary of Electronic Data
Systems Corp. at the time.113 The complaint alleged that Srinivasan directed at least $720,000
in illicit payments to senior employees of Indian
state-owned enterprises to retain its business with
those enterprises. On a neither admit-nor-deny
basis, the SEC ordered Srinivasan to pay a $70,000
penalty.
While there have only been a handful of purely
foreign companies and nationals that have settled
FCPA enforcement actions, dozens of foreign
companies have recently disclosed potential violations of the FCPA and are currently under investigation for the improper activity, including “ABB
(Switzerland, energy); Alcatel Lucent (France,
communications); AstraZeneca (UK-Sweden,
pharmaceuticals); BAE Systems (UK, defence);
Daimler (Germany, automotive); Innospec (UK,
chemicals); Magyar Telekom (Hungary, telecoms);
Norsk Hydro (Norway, energy); Novo Nordisk
(Denmark, health, pharmaceuticals); Panalpina
(Switzerland, transport); Siemens (Germany,
engineering, electronics); Smith & Nephew (UK,
medical devices); Total (France, energy).”114
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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Another trend that has arisen with respect
to the prosecution of foreign companies and
nationals is parallel prosecutions and investigations. FCPA enforcement is just one weapon in
an arsenal of international agreements enacted
to combat bribery throughout the world, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Officials in International
Business Transactions, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the African
Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Recent enforcement activity
and investigations indicate that disclosure to
foreign officials and a full investigation of a
firm by foreign prosecutors does not preclude
U.S. authorities from pursuing a matter. Rather,
coordination between the United States and
foreign authorities has resulted in an increase
in the number of joint investigations and FCPA
enforcement actions.
Of course, even if a foreign prosecutor declines
to pursue allegations of bribery, the U.S. is still
likely to act if it has jurisdiction over the matter.
For example, as discussed earlier, in 2006, Statoil
ASA, a Norwegian company, settled an FCPA
enforcement action with the DOJ by agreeing
to pay $21 million—half as a fine payable to the
DOJ and half as disgorgement and prejudgment
interest to the SEC. The DOJ pursued the case
even though Statoil had already been investigated
and fined $3 million by Norwegian authorities
for the same improper activity. 115 Similarly, in
its announcement of a deferred prosecution
agreement with Akzo Nobel for its violation of
the FCPA, the DOJ noted that the Dutch National Public Prosecutor’s Office for Financial,
Economic, and Environmental Offences was
also investigating an Akzo subsidiary regarding
its conduct under the Oil for Food Program,
and it was expected the company would pay a
criminal fine of approximately €381,000 in the
Netherlands. 116 Under the agreement with the
DOJ, failure to resolve the charges with Dutch
officials would require Akzo to pay $800,000 to
the U.S. Treasury.
The United States is also currently investigating
allegations into Siemens AG’s potential violations of
13
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the FCPA.117 Some estimates indicate the company
has uncovered over $1.9 billion in questionable
payments. It is expected the investigation will
potentially result in the largest fines in history,118
despite the fact that Siemens has already paid
fines ordered by German courts totaling over
$290 million (based on related charges).119 The
company has also reportedly spent over $500
million on its internal investigation into the
improper activity.120 Similar investigations into
Siemens’ improper activity are taking place in
over 10 different countries and German courts
are currently prosecuting individuals responsible
for the corrupt activity. In July 2008, German
authorities announced a criminal verdict of
breach of trust against Reinhard Siekaczek for
his role in funneling €49 million ($77 million)
into slush funds for bribes to help win contracts
for the company.121
A parallel prosecution that has received
enormous publicity involves BAE Systems, PLC.
The United States is investigating allegations of
improper activity related to BAE’s £40 billion Al
Yamamah arms contract with Saudi Arabia.122 The
British Serious Fraud Office closed its inquiry
into the matter in 2006, but the DOJ continued
with its inquiry based on, among other reasons,
reports that the company spent £1.1 million in
Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and New York to cover
the cost of hotels, security, transportation, and
other expenses for visiting senior Saudi officials.123 In its investigation into the allegations
against BAE, the United States has coordinated
its investigative efforts with Swiss authorities who
have agreed to provide relevant financial records
to assist the DOJ’s investigation.124 On July 30,
2008, the House of Lords, the United Kingdom’s
highest court, overruled a lower court finding
that the Serious Fraud Office had improperly
closed the investigation into the bribery allegations.125 Despite finding that the Serious Fraud
Office acted lawfully in closing its investigation,
the court’s ruling is unlikely to deter the U.S.
investigation into this matter.
Given the U.S. authorities’ intent to aggressively pursue foreign companies that violate the
FCPA, it is imperative that any foreign company
subject to U.S. jurisdiction take all necessary steps
to ensure compliance with the law.
14
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Voluntary Disclosures & The Costs Of
Violating The FCPA
■

Trend Of Voluntarily Disclosing FCPA
Violations

Most FCPA investigations and enforcement actions today are prompted by voluntary disclosures
of potential violations. While companies are not
required by law to voluntarily disclose potential
FCPA violations, they usually do so based on legal,
financial, and reputational considerations. The
primary reason for the dramatic increase in the
number of FCPA investigations and enforcement
actions is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.126 Under
Sarbanes-Oxley, companies must do more than
tighten their internal controls and verify the accuracy of accounts and financial statements; they
must also identify any “material weaknesses” that
affect the internal controls, including potential
improper activity, and address these matters
within a reasonable time. Sarbanes-Oxley also
imposes increased obligations on companies to
disclose potential liabilities to shareholders—a
requirement that encourages companies to be
forthcoming about potential FCPA violations as
well. In addition to the influence of SarbanesOxley, there has been a general trend in FCPA
enforcement for companies to voluntarily disclose
potential violations and to cooperate with U.S.
officials in an attempt to achieve favorable treatment and mitigate potential penalties.
Although the Government claims it will reward
companies that self-report improper activity, a
review of recent enforcement actions demonstrates that the SEC and the DOJ are still likely
to impose harsh penalties on companies that
voluntarily disclose FCPA violations. For example,
in an enforcement action noted above, Willbros
Group, Inc. announced in May 2008 that it would
pay $32.3 million in penalties and disgorgement
(a $22 million criminal penalty to the DOJ and
$10.3 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest
to the SEC) to resolve FCPA violations after the
company self-reported the potential violations to
the Government.127 Although the Government
claimed that it considered Willbros’ voluntary
disclosure in determining its penalty, it is difficult
to discern exactly how the voluntary disclosure
mitigated the penalty in this matter. Furthermore,
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West

★

SEPTEMBER

BRIEFING PAPERS

after Schnitzer Steel voluntarily disclosed a $1.9
million improper payment, the Government fined
the company $7.5 million in criminal penalties
and $7.7 million in disgorgement.128 In contrast,
after the Government learned of Statoil ASA’s
$5.2 million in improper payments from Norwegian newspapers, the U.S. Government fined the
company $10.5 million in criminal penalties and
$10.5 million in disgorgement of profit.129 A comparison of these two actions does not adequately
demonstrate the benefit Schnitzer received from
its voluntary disclosure.
The Government encourages the voluntary
disclosure by parties that discover potential FCPA
violations and, while declining to guarantee a
specific outcome, contends a company will receive
some benefit in return.130 To date, the Government has neither clarified nor demonstrated
what constitutes the “benefit” received in return
for a complete disclosure and cooperation with
Government investigations, but has stated that
a voluntary disclosure will be considered by the
government when determining a penalty.131 Former
Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher explained
the reason for the lack of clarity as follows:132
[I]t would not make sense for law enforcement
to make one-size-fits-all promises about the benefits of voluntary disclosure before getting all of
the facts.
It also would not be in the best interests of
law enforcement to make promises about lenient
treatment in cases where the magnitude, duration, or high-level management involvement in
the disclosed conduct may warrant a guilty plea
and a significant penalty. But what I can say is that
there is always a benefit to corporate cooperation,
including voluntary disclosure….
The fact is, if you are doing the things you
should be doing—whether it is self-policing, selfreporting, conducting proactive risk assessments,
improving your controls and procedures, training
on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation
after it starts—you will get a benefit. It may not
mean that you or your client will get a complete
pass, but you will get a real, tangible benefit.
There have been cases where companies have
come in and voluntarily disclosed real FCPA violations that we have not prosecuted at all. On the
other hand, in other cases a voluntary disclosure
might result in a guilty plea, depending on the
circumstances.
So although nothing is off the table when you
voluntarily disclose, I can tell you in unequivocal
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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terms that you will get a real benefit— just like
Schnitzer Steel did. As I said earlier, Schnitzer
Steel was an excellent example of corporate cooperation.

Despite the Government’s assurances that selfreporting and cooperation will result in a tangible benefit, recent enforcement trends do not
reflect this promise. As a result, it remains to be
seen whether companies will continue to choose
voluntary disclosure as the preferred method of
resolving FCPA violations.
■

FCPA Enforcement Tools: Fines, Penalties &
Incarceration

The FCPA provides both criminal and civil
penalties for the violation of its provisions. Penalties for violations of the antibribery provisions
include a fine of up to $2 million and a $10,000
civil penalty for corporations and other business
entities and a $10,000 civil penalty and a fine of
up to $100,000 and five years’ imprisonment for
willful violations for officers, directors, stockholders, employees, and agents (including non-U.S.
nationals).133 Violations of the recordkeeping and
internal control provisions are typically punished
with civil penalties that range in size depending
on the circumstances. Specifically, maximum
civil penalties range from $5,000 to $100,000
for an individual and $50,000 to $500,000 for an
entity, or the gross amount of pecuniary gain.134
Criminal violations of the books-and-records
provisions carry a maximum penalty of a $25
million fine for entities, a $5 million fine and
20 years’ incarceration for persons, or twice the
amount of pecuniary gain to the defendant or
loss caused to anyone else.135 Further, under the
”Sentence of Fine” statute, the actual fine may be
up to twice the benefit that the defendant sought
to obtain by making the corrupt payment.136 The
Government also usually seeks disgorgement of
any ill-gotten gains associated with the improper
activity.
Beyond monetary and pecuniary penalties, the
Government has a laundry list of administrative
penalties that it can use against violators of the
FCPA. For example, companies that do business with the Government may be debarred or
suspended from future Government contracting
opportunities.137 Companies or persons may also
15
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be deemed ineligible to receive export licenses,
barred from trading securities, or prohibited from
participating in other agency programs.138
There appears to be no consistent pattern to the
determination of penalties associated with FCPA
violations. While certain factors (e.g., the size of
the bribe, the benefit a company receives from
its improper activity, and prior FCPA violations)
are likely to influence the penalty determination,
the process lacks transparency. Still, the Government has been aggressive in its punishment of
FCPA violators and recent enforcement actions
have resulted in the largest fines in FCPA history.
In addition to Baker Hughes’ $44 million settlement,139 other companies have been required to
pay in the tens of millions to settle their FCPA
cases. In May 2008, as described above, Willbros
Group, Inc. announced that it would pay $32.3
million in penalties and disgorgement to resolve
FCPA violations relating to its operations in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nigeria.140 The Government
alleged that Willbros employees made corrupt
payments totaling more than $6.3 million to
Nigerian government officials to assist in obtaining and retaining a $387 million contract. On
November 14, 2007, Chevron Corp. agreed to pay
a $30 million to settle FCPA charges that it made
over $20 million in improper payments.141 Of the
$30 million penalty Chevron paid to settle this
matter, $25 million constituted disgorgement.
Also, in March 2005, Titan paid $28.5 million (the
pre-Baker Hughes fine recordholder) for bribes
totaling $3.5 million. 142 The Government claims
it considers factors such as voluntary disclosure,
cooperation, and FCPA compliance programs
when determining how to penalize a company
for violating the FCPA. It is not clear, however,
how much these additional factors influence the
penalty determination.
■

Settlements, Nonprosecution/Deferred
Prosecution Agreements & Corporate Monitors

Currently, most enforcement actions brought
by the Government are resolved either by the execution of a consent decree (SEC), a nonprosecution or deferred prosecution agreement (DOJ),
or both. A typical nonprosecution or deferred
prosecution agreement contains a promise by
the Government to refrain from criminally pros16
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ecuting a company in exchange for cooperation,
changes in the corporate structure, continued
compliance with the FCPA, and the payment
of any fines or penalties imposed as a result of
the improper activity. These agreements allow
the Government to administer punishment and
extract concessions while reserving the right to
take action against the company at a later date
should the company fail to follow through with
its compliance obligations or if further violations
are discovered. Because of the reputational damage associated with a conviction, companies often
prefer to resolve FCPA violations in this manner,
though it is certainly arguable that most of the
reputational damage has already occurred by the
time an FCPA violation becomes public knowledge. Even without a conviction, companies will
still be subjected to negative press, reputational
harm, and a potential loss of business as the result
of public release of FCPA allegations. Still, this
appears to be the preferred course of action for
companies at this time.
The prevalence of these agreements has also
resulted in another trend: the appointment of
an independent compliance monitor as a condition to settlement. Monitors are retained at the
company’s expense and are tasked with scrutinizing the company’s compliance with the FCPA for
a specific period of time (typically two or three
years). A review of recent enforcement actions
suggests a trend of requiring monitors in most
FCPA resolutions, regardless of the circumstances
of a particular matter.143 The DOJ, however, contends that various factors are considered when
determining whether to require the appointment
of a monitor, including “the strength of the
company’s existing management and compliance
team, the pervasiveness of the problem, and the
strength of the company’s existing FCPA policies
and procedures.”144
Independent monitors are very expensive and
companies are generally responsible for adopting
the FCPA compliance recommendations suggested by the monitor. Not only must a company
pay for cost of the monitor’s services (typically
at high hourly rates), but they must absorb the
costs of implementing the compliance recommendations—an undertaking that can be quite
costly depending on the extent of the monitor’s
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West
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recommendations. In addition to monetary considerations, independent monitors put a company
at significant risk for the discovery and disclosure of additional FCPA violations. Because the
monitor is charged by the Government with filing
regular reports on a company’s compliance with
its recommendations and the FCPA in general,
any improper activity or noncompliance that is
discovered may have to be reported under the
terms of a particular agreement. This has resulted
in additional concerns over the implications for
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege that
may be weakened by the presence of such thirdparties within the companies.145
In response to recent criticism associated with
the use of corporate monitors in the resolution
of enforcement actions, on March 7, 2008, the
DOJ issued a memorandum setting forth nine
principles to guide the use of monitors in deferred and nonprosecution arrangements.146 The
memorandum, titled “The Selection and Use of
Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements
and Non-Prosecution Agreements With Corporations,” provides guidelines to be followed when
selecting a monitor and defining the terms of a
monitor arrangement. It also makes clear that the
guidance is considered by the DOJ to be “practical
and flexible,” and will often vary giving the facts
and circumstances of each particular enforcement
action (e.g., whether the company does not have
an effective internal compliance program or has
ceased operations in the area where the criminal
misconduct occurred). The nine principles address, in general (1) the qualifications to consider
in selecting a monitor, (2) the independence
of a monitor, (3) the monitor’s responsibilities,
(4) the scope of the monitorship, (5) communication with the Government, (6) adoption
or dispute of the monitor’s recommendations,
(7) reporting of previously undisclosed or new
misconduct, (8) the duration of the monitorship,
and (9) termination. While the principles attempt
to provide more uniformity with respect to the
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appointment of monitors and the scope of their
arrangements, they still leave prosecutors with
great discretion to carry out these obligations. It
remains to be seen whether the new policies will
inject transparency into the process and result in
a more uniform application of this process.
■

Collateral Or Related Litigation

In addition to the high fines and potential
jail time that FCPA violators may face, companies may find themselves defending additional
lawsuits brought by private parties. There has
been an explosion recently in collateral civil
litigation brought by angry shareholders of
corporations charged with violating the FCPA.
Typical cases generally include Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) 147 securities fraud
actions and shareholder derivative suits. For
example, after settling an enforcement action
totaling more than $2.95 million with both the
SEC and the DOJ, 148 FARO Technologies, Inc.
settled a securities fraud class action lawsuit for
$6.875 million. The complaint alleged that the
company deliberately misrepresented information regarding the adequacy of the company’s
systems of internal controls and misreported
critical financial information regarding FARO’s
performance to artificially inflate the company’s
stock price.149 Similarly, a Michigan public pension fund filed suit against BAE Systems alleging
that BAE’s directors negligently and recklessly
breached their fiduciary duties by allowing managers to violate the FCPA. 150 Titan Corp. also
faced multiple suits from its shareholders after
its FCPA enforcement actions became public. 151
These cases demonstrate that any “benefit” a
company may realize in avoiding conviction
and settling FCPA charges with the Government
may still result in costly consequences. Once
an FCPA enforcement action is made public,
shareholders may seek redress for the penalties
and reputational harm attributed to a company’s
failure to prevent violations of the FCPA.

GUIDELINES
       These Guidelines are intended to provide guidance regarding FCPA compliance and enforcement issues. They are not, however, a substitute
for professional representation in any specific
situation.
© 2008 by Thomson Reuters/West

1. Draft and implement an FCPA policy that
explains the Act’s requirements and defines its
provisions. Require all employees involved with
international transactions and accounting matters
to certify that they have received and read a copy of
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the policy. The policy should be easy to understand
and avoid the use of excessive legalese.
2. Establish a culture of compliance, making
clear acceptable practices with respect to overseas
activity, recordkeeping, and internal controls.
A zero-tolerance policy towards noncompliance
should be instituted and management should be
clear about its commitment to FCPA compliance.
3. Make the FCPA policy applicable to all
company subsidiaries and their employees. All
policy directives should control, even if a foreign
subsidiary’s local law provides different requirements. Any discrepancy should be reported to
company legal counsel.
4. Institute an ethics “hotline” or other internal
reporting mechanism and encourage employees
to report any suspicious activities to the company
compliance officer (or company legal counsel).
Assure employees that there will be no reprisal
if a violation or potential violation is reported. If
possible, employees should be able to file reports
anonymously.
5. Expressly prohibit making any facilitating or “grease” payments without prior, written
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approval from company legal counsel. If a payment is approved by legal counsel, the company
must ensure that it is properly recorded in the
company books and records as a “facilitating
payment.”
6. Do not pay any “promotional expenses,”
including the travel, lodging, or entertainment
expenses of foreign officials without the prior,
written approval of company legal counsel.
Any trip involving a foreign official must have
a legitimate business purpose and must be narrowly tailored to serve this purpose.
7. Carefully scrutinize all prospective business relationships with foreign agents or representatives. Due diligence must be thorough
and well documented and reviewed by highlevel company officers or management. Any
agreement executed between the company and
intermediary must expressly require compliance with the FCPA.
8. Review all agreements with foreign intermediaries frequently and carefully monitor all
transactions executed under the agreement.
9. Be on the lookout for FCPA “red flags” at
all times.
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